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CASE NOTES
comparative ease with which management obtains approval of its proposals
should afford a practical means to "continue in effect" this relationship
while still complying with the court's interpretation of the statute.
GEORGE T. LENEHAN
Labor Law—Federal Pre-Emption Doctrine—Criminal Trespass.—
People v. Goduto. 1—The defendants, non-employee union organizers, en-
tered upon a parking lot, leased by Sears, Roebuck and Company adjacent
to one of their Chicago stores, for the purpose of distributing union leaf-
lets and questionnaires to the store's employees. The operating superintend-
ent asked them to leave several times, but each time they refused. The
superintendent then called the police, who arrested the defendants and
charged them with a violation of Illinois' criminal trespass statute. 2 After
being convicted in the Chicago Municipal Court, they appealed on the
ground, inter alia, that Illinois had no jurisdiction because of federal pre-
emption of labor disputes. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. HELD:
"1T]he maintenance of domestic peace and the absence of any preventive
relief for the protection of the employer's property rights is of sufficient
importance to give Ithe state] . . . jurisdiction to enforce the criminal
trespass statute . ." 3 And although it is arguable that the defendants'
conduct was protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 4
and notwithstanding the fact that a state has no jurisdiction to determine
the validity of this defense, nevertheless, because of the defendants' fail-
ure to invoke the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, the
state could assume jurisdiction of the crime charged.5
The expansion of the federal government into areas once the private
domain of the states has been a continuing cause of jurisdictional conflict.
A frequent battleground is labor-management relations. Following the
enactment of the Wagner Act in 1935, 6 a series of cases in the United
(1959): "While it (proxy voting) is a useful device to get things done, it is also a
device which favors management in its operation, more than the corporation shareholder."
1 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961), cert. denied, 30 U.S.L. Week 3179 (U.S.
Dec. 5, 1961).
2 Whoever ... is unlawfully upon the enclosed or unenclosed land of another
and is notified to depart therefrom by the owner, or occupant, or by his agent
or servant, and neglects or refuses so to do, . . . shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. . . .
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 565 (1957).
3 174 N.E.2d at 388.
4 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
6 Contra, Freeman v. Local 1207, Retail Clerks, 363 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1961);
State v. Williams, 37 CCH Lab. Cas. § 65,708 (Md. Crim. Ct., Baltimore City, 1959).
The defendants also contended that, under Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
their right to disseminate information was protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The court distinguished the Marsh case by
limiting it to its facts and held that the defendants' conduct was not constitutionally
protected. On this point there is contrary authority. See People v. Maio, 38 CCH Lab.
Cas. 9 68,835 (111. Cir. Ct. 1959) ; State v. Williams, supra.
6 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1958).
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States Supreme Court severely restricted the power of the states to regulate
labor disputes covered by the terms of the act. 7 These cases culminated
in the decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon 8 which
reserved to the NLRB primary jurisdiction in any case in which the ac-
tivity to be regulated is arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by
section 8. Exception to this rule is made in two kinds of cases: those
involving matters only tangentially affecting the national labor policy° and
those involving "conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the
public order.")
The court in the instant case assumes that the activity of the defend-
ants is arguably protected by section 7. Nevertheless, the court asserted
two grounds for jurisdiction. The first is that, because a trespasser's re-
fusal to leave upon the owner's request gives the owner the right of self-
help, such a refusal creates a threat of imminent violence. The second is
that the willful failure of the defendants to assert their claim of right
before the NLRB leaves the dispute open to state jurisdiction.
Perhaps if the exchange between the parties had gone beyond words
and exploded into violence, the state would have been justified in asserting
jurisdiction. But no blows were struck and the court was forced to rely
on the inference of impending violence that arises whenever one man re-
fuses to leave the property of another. Without a doubt this threat would
be sufficient to warrant imposition by the state of criminal penalties in
trespass cases not complicated by federal pre-emption or constitutional
questions. But once the federal government has imposed its system of
uniform regulation upon a proper subject, it is most unlikely that it will
be lifted by so weak an inference of violence.
There has not yet been any United States Supreme Court ruling on
this question. All the cases involving violence which have thus far come
before the Court have manifested it on a grand scale." The threat to the
public peace and safety was clear; there was little danger that the states
were using their concern for good order as a pretext for illicit regulation.
But if the states are allowed to assume jurisdiction on the basis of a con-
structive threat of violence, then criminal trespass and breach of the peace
7
 See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; Guss v.
Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) ; Teamsters Union v. New York, N.H. &
H. R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956) ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 485 (1955) ;
Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) ; Amalgamated Assn. of
Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Hill v. Florida, 325
U.S. 538 (1945),
8
 Supra note 7.
9
 International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
19 Garmon case, supra note 7, at 247.
11
 See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (massed pickets preventing ingress and
egress from a plant by threats and force of numbers) ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S.
131 (1957) (massed picketing, name calling, threats, and seeding of the parking lot with
roofing tacks) ; UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956)
(massed pickets preventing ingress and egress from plant, coercion of employees and
threats of physical injury) ; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954) (threats of violence and presence of a large crowd, some drunk and some
armed).
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statutes will become a potent threat to the uniformity of regulation which
Congress has found desirable.
The court's second argument is that the failure of the parties to invoke
the jurisdiction of the NLRB may result in a special power in the states to
assume jurisdiction. This seems to spring from a feeling that, at least in
this type of case, someone must adjudicate the matter. However, the
cases are unanimous in holding that whenever (barring only the excep-
tions noted above) the controversy falls within the terms of sections 7
or 8, only the NLRB can have primary jurisdiction,'2 and that this ju-
risdiction can be ceded to the states only in accordance with certain narrow
statutory provisions. 13
 There is nothing either in the statute or in the
cases to indicate that inaction by the parties can create new exceptions
to the primacy of the Board's jurisdiction.
A careful reading of the law, particularly the Garmon case,' 4 suggests
that the instant case was wrongly decided. Nevertheless, the Illinois court
has brought into focus a grave deficiency in the existing law. Almost cer-
tainly an employer in Sears' position has no basis for complaint to the
NLRB. 15
 Most probably the union, because of the decision in NLRB v.
Babcock-Wilcox Co.," would not go to the Board. Without application by
one of the parties, the Board cannot act. And, without a determination by
the Board that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited, the state is
excluded by the Garmon decision." This would leave the employer in the
unhappy position of either permitting the union to use its property for an
unwanted organizational campaign, or hiring guards to keep the union out.
If the union conduct is not protected by section 7, the employer should not
be forced to tolerate the union's presence. But from the point of view of a
store, such as Sears, whose principal appeal is to the lower middle income
group, it is clearly undesirable to post anti-union guards.
One solution to this dilemma, which would give the employer the relief
it needs and still preserve the primacy of the NLRB, is to grant the em-
ployer access to the Board for the purpose of determining whether or not
the union's activity is protected. In the event that the conduct was found to
12 Supra note 8.
13
 Prior to the 1959 amendments to the act, unless the Board had ceded jurisdiction
under § 10(a), 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958), no state court or agency
could assume jurisdiction, even where the Board had declined it for monetary reasons.
Guss v. Utah Labor Board, supra note 7. Section 701(a) of the 1959 amendments changed
this to the extent that now the states can take jurisdiction if the Board declines it. 73
Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2) (Supp. II, 1958).
14 Supra note 8.
25
 Absent a finding that the leaflets distributed by the defendants contained
"threat[s] of reprisal or force or promise of benefit", section 8(c) would prevent a
finding that the defendants committed an unfair labor practice. Thus, the employer
would get no federal relief and would still be barred from the state courts by the
possibility that the union's conduct was protected under § 7.
16
 351 U.S. 105 (1956), in which it was held that non-employee union organizers
did not have a right to distribute union literature on the employer's property unless
there were no reasonable alternative channels of communication with the employees.
The union would be hard pressed to prove this in the instant case where the vast bulk
of the employees live in the city of Chicago.
17 Supra note 7.
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be outside the terms of the act, i.e., neither protected nor prohibited, the
state court would have jurisdiction to hear the employer's plea for state
relief.
JOSEPH D. BERMINGHAM, JR.
Labor Law—LMRDA Civil Enforcement Section—Local Union Officer
Has No Cause of Action in Tort Against District Union Officials in
Their Individual Capacities.—Tomko v. Hilbert. 1—Tomko, appellant,
commenced an action under Title I ("bill of rights") of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) 2 against Hilbert
and Kreheley, appellees, for damages and an injunction, alleging that ap-
pellees assaulted, libeled, and, by means of threats, force and disorderly con-
duct, interfered with his rights as a local union member and president by
disrupting the conduct of regular business meetings and regular business.
Appellees are both officials of the district union of which Tomko's local is
a part, but the complaint merely charged the appellees in their individual
capacities and did not allege that any labor organization, or any officer or
agent thereof acting in his official capacity, had violated the appellant's
rights under the "bill of rights." The United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania 3 dismissed the action on the ground that
the appellant had failed to exhaust his internal union remedies. On appeal
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. HELD: A local union
member and officer has no cause of action for damages and/or an injunction
against (district) union officials in their individual capacities absent diver-
sity jurisdiction. The majority of the Court of Appeals reached the con-
clusion that the LMRDA deals exclusively with the union-member relation-
ship after considering the language of the LMRDA, its purpose, the evils
it was intended to cure, and its legislative history. Judge Hastie concurred
on the ground that, although the record was not very clear, the conclusion
of the district court was warranted. Judge Hastie suggested that if the
district court were wrong the appellant should merely be given leave to plead
over.
There was no National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) jurisdiction
of this case because there were no facts alleged which would put it within
the ambit of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), sec-
tions 8(b) 8(6)(2), or 8(b) (5). 4
 The LMRA is operative in the area
of employer-employee-union relationships and concerns the action of these
groups as they affect wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Title I of the LMRDA, more popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin
Act, grants to every member of a labor organization the fundamental rights
to nominate candidates for election, to vote in organization elections, to
attend and participate in meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regu-
lations; 5
 to speak and assemble freely with other members and to express
1 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).
2
 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411 (Supp. 1960).
3 46 L.R.R.M. 2853 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
4 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
5
 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (1) (Supp. 1960).
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